Instructions from the General Political Department of the Military Commission on the Army's Continued Implementation of the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionary Work

Date: April 1, 1951 Author: General Political Department of the Military Commission

General Political Department of the Military Commission

According to the current inspection materials, the army's rightward bias towards clearing out bandits of varying degrees “broad leniency” in its policy of combining repression with leniency has generally been corrected. The results are quite significant. Incomplete statistics from the military regions of Southwest China, Central South China, Northwest China, North China, and East China over the past year: 42,078 counter-revolutionary ringleaders such as bandit leaders, bullies, and spies were executed, 29,420 were sentenced to prison, and a large number are still being detained and trained. However, there are still a large number of bandits, spies, and resolute counter-revolutionaries who, under the deterrence of our military pressure and mass movements, have adopted dispersed and latent activities, striving to remain hidden and attempting to make a comeback. Bandits still exist in some areas. Under these circumstances, we must continue our efforts to eliminate the source of bandits and eradicate their problems, and not be mistaken for them “suppression is enough” and let our guard down a little.

Although some counter-revolutionary elements within the army were suppressed, it was still far from enough. With the victory of the Liberation War, the composition of the troops changed greatly (an unprecedented change in history). Spies, reactionary party groups, landlord bullies, feudal secret societies, hidden reactionary officers and pseudo-staff took the opportunity to mix in a lot. According to statistics from the Yunnan Military Region, each company of these personnel has an average of more than ten people. It turned out that the enemy was plotting to sabotage our army. Especially when class struggle becomes more acute and land reform and the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities gradually deepen, they have an opportunity to retaliate. Due to insufficient attention from leaders and the general lack of special arrangements, the troops still have a serious tendency to become paralyzed from the right, with tendencies towards “serious crimes, less punishment”, “serious disciplinary prisoners, less political prisoners”, or “strict local conditions, lenient troops”; some bad elements are considered “attempted criminals” or “automatically confessing” and are not dealt with; the attitude towards old officers

and other old personnel is not serious enough There is insufficient attention paid to those with serious problems; some people emphasize technology and accommodate it; they blindly believe that “there is nothing wrong with the troops”; the organizational system is not strict and there are many loopholes. As a result, sabotage incidents by internal counter-revolutionaries occurred frequently, seriously affecting the political and organizational purity and consolidation within the troops. Chairman Mao instructed: “We believe that drawing attention to the issue of suppressing counter-revolutionaries and handling it correctly in all military institutions, schools, and troops is an important political task at present, and those who neglect this task should be criticized.”

Based on the above circumstances, it is hereby stipulated that:

Deepen class education. To enable the troops to draw a clear line between friend and foe in their thinking, correct misconceptions, raise the vigilance of the entire army, strengthen their sense of responsibility, and plug loopholes. Fight against “broad-minded” right-leaning or insensitive ideologies and emotions, and correctly grasp and implement policies that combine repression and leniency. We must have a sufficient understanding that rectifying internal thoughts, exposing and eliminating counter-revolutionary rumors, and suppressing all destructive activities of counter-revolutionaries are important links in consolidating internal affairs and improving the fighting spirit of the troops from an ideological, political, and organizational perspective.

Documents such as the Central Committee's directive on October 10 last year “on suppressing counter-revolutionary activities”, the Central People's Government's promulgation in February this year “Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Punishing Counter-Revolutionaries”, Comrade Peng Zhen's report “on the issue of suppressing counter-revolutionaries and regulations on punishing counter-revolutionaries”, and “why it is necessary to resolutely suppress counter-revolutionaries” must be effectively organized and studied. Propaganda and education departments at the military or provincial level and above should compile popular teaching materials and pamphlets based on the actual situation of the troops, conduct general and in-depth education, and internal newspapers and various literary and artistic activities should be appropriately coordinated. This was an important part of the military class education in 1951.

Carefully clean up the interior, purify the organization, and oppose the revolutionaries' resolute suppression:

Anyone who is found to have a solid basis for any counter-revolutionary sabotage activities and political intentional rumors or slander, regardless of their nationality,

shall be arrested at any time and sentenced at the discretion of the court. Those who have committed historical crimes should be dealt with more severely.

All professional spies, reactionaries, key personnel at or above the regimental level, pseudo-political workers at or above the regimental level, and leading elements of feudal sects (such as those equivalent to I-Kuan Tao point masters or above) who have been found to have no current activities should be eliminated and should not be retained or added to the army Those who have committed blood debts or serious crimes and have not made meritorious atonement will be dealt with according to law, while the rest will be subject to long-term or disciplinary training or transferred to local public security departments for control.

For bullies, bandit leaders, and habitual bandits who infiltrate the troops, the severity of the circumstances should be determined according to military law. Those whose crimes are so serious that they are hated by the general public can be transferred to local authorities for death or imprisonment.

For suspected counter-revolutionaries, we should actively and carefully arrange reconnaissance, effectively grasp the materials, strengthen research, clarify the problems, and solve the case in a timely manner. We must be highly vigilant against all kinds of conspiracies by the enemy, including those involving internal traitors, long-term lurking, waiting for opportunities to destroy, internal and external integration, and attacking me. Especially the traitors who hide the deepest, are good at disguising themselves, and steal the important positions, who are the most harmful to me. Regular understanding must be conducted in conjunction with review, party consolidation, and side investigations in order to identify and clarify problems. Those who are considered to be highly suspected but are difficult to identify at the moment should be immediately transferred from the head office, confidential department or other important positions, and appropriately placed to control and continue reconnaissance.

Those in the military who intentionally shield landlords, bullies, or other counter-revolutionaries, or who use their power to facilitate their activities, may be subject to disciplinary action or sentenced, depending on the severity of the circumstances.

In order to purify the organization, close loopholes, and prevent counter-revolutionaries from continuing to infiltrate, it is strictly forbidden to take in people privately. All employees must undergo review by the security authorities and certification from the local public security authorities.

Continue to expedite the handling of the officers who surrendered in the uprising:

All military regions should handle the matter promptly in accordance with the principles and guidelines instructed by the General Political Department of the Military Commission on December 28, 1950. Those who continue to engage in counter-revolutionary activities, important secret agents, or those who have committed serious crimes will be arrested and prosecuted. The Political Department of the Southwest Military Region issued on March 5 “Supplementary Instructions on Handling Old Officers of the Uprising” and on March 20 “Regulations on Handling Old Officers and Old Staff”, which can be followed by the entire army.

Instructions were issued for the handling of captured officers in custody.

The seven tasks identified at the All-Army Security Work Conference, among which review should be a key focus in 1951. It must be carried out in a planned, step-by-step, and focused manner (for those who enlisted after 1949) in accordance with the requirements of the documents, and results must be achieved. A large number of newly joined intellectuals should conduct a general review in conjunction with local public security departments, and publicly announce the expulsion and purge of landlords, bullies (not referring to family background), and other bad elements, and transfer them back to the local area along with the materials. Technical personnel retained or employed by the Navy, Air Force, special forces, and technical departments should also undergo a general review and appropriate handling. The security and confidentiality work of government agencies should be given serious attention. A time limit will be set to thoroughly review all personnel in government agencies and those around the head. In local armed forces and people's armed forces, it is essential to strictly prevent the infiltration of bad elements. To strengthen the leadership of the review work, under the leadership of the Party committees at all levels above the regimental level, the review committee will be organized by relevant departments such as organization, security, cadres, and military affairs, with a number of five to nine people.

Bandit suppression forces should combine political disintegration with mobilizing the masses, continue to carry out military clearance, extinguish the bandits within a time limit, and under unified leadership, disperse and suppress them, cooperate with mass bandit-catching movements, and completely eradicate the latent and scattered bandits. Quickly deal with captured bandits and resolutely suppress bandit leaders, habitual bandits and other ruthless counter-revolutionaries. The bias of viewing captured bandits as current counter-revolutionaries and as captured officers and liberation fighters must be corrected. Organizers, masterminds, and commanders who re-turned into bandits after the uprising, or who defected into bandits while using local

weapons or people's armed forces, must be executed according to law. Those who cause great harm to the masses and the masses demand that they be handed over to the local authorities for handling may be sentenced by the local authorities.

The key to completing the above work tasks is to strengthen the leadership of the Party Committee, ensure that the heads are conscientious and responsible, and effectively grasp and implement political mechanisms. We must make thorough ideological and organizational preparations, take necessary steps (current and primary) for different departments and units according to the possible conditions of subjective forces, formulate plans, and handle them separately. We must never implement them as a general mass movement.

In order to be both “stable” and “accurate” and “ruthless”, you must pay attention to strategy. The suppression of counter-revolutionaries within the military should be differentiated from that at the local level, and should not be based on a murder budget or a concentrated execution of prisoners. We should be especially cautious with the insurgent forces that have not yet been reformed, as well as with units where our control is weak, to prevent excessive tremors and accidents. The execution of all prisoners must be based on concrete evidence, widely publicized, exposing the crimes of counter-revolutionaries, and educating the general public. When a death sentence is imposed, the power of approval belongs to the Party Committee of the Corps or provincial military region or above (the Party Committee of the division entrusted to the bandit leader or habitual bandit may approve it), and the verdict shall be publicly pronounced and executed in the name of the military law departments at all levels. The most important ones must be reported to the General Political Department of the Military Commission for approval. Anyone who truly confesses automatically and gives clues to the material must be treated with leniency as appropriate.

According to Chairman Mao's two telegrams on March 11 and March 30, 1951, all military regions and special forces, except those that have made complete reviews and decisions, must make another review and implementation decision, and promptly report the review situation and your plans for implementing this instruction and the future implementation status to the General Political Department of the Military Commission.

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